409 presidential candidate of the party then occupying the White House, and together they yield a strong forecasting equation (Campbell and Wink 1990 ). In the 1992 election, the model in the first week of September accurately predicted that President Bush would be defeated 2 months later. The trial-heat-based forecast missed the two-party vote split for Clinton and Bush by only about one half of a percentage point, despite the disrupting presence and strong showing of the independent candidacy of Ross Perot (Campbell and Mann 1992; Morin 1992) .'
The vote forecast made 2 months before the election was more accurate than 9 pundits and as accurate as another 5 of 15 pundits surveyed within a few days of the election (Broder 1992) , more accurate than the Gallup/USA Today/CNN poll of registered voters conducted within the last week of the campaign (Benedetto 1992b) , and about as accurate as Gallup's November survey of likely voters (Benedetto 1992a; Meyer 1992 1968,1980,1988, and 1992 (Tufte 1978 Table 5 .
At each of the seven points examined in the election year, the trial-heat forecast, augmented by the second-quarter economic growth rate, yields a stronger forecast model than the trial-heat regression Figure 2 provides some perspective on the trial heats as literal forecasts, adjusted through bivariate regression and further adjusted by the context of the economic growth rate in the spring of the election year. The figure plots the mean absolute error of the three forms of trial-heat forecasts at each of the seven points in the election year. At each point, the bivariate trial-heat regression offers a generally more accurate vote prediction than a literal trial-heat forecast, and the trial-heat and economy regression offers a generally more accurate vote prediction than the bivariate regression. As the figure demonstrates, the most accurate trial-heat-based forecasts are the trial-heat and economy forecasts using the September trial-heat polls.
Although the goodness-of-fit statistics of the early September trialheat and economy forecast model are impressive, an out-of-sample examination of the model offers a stronger test. The strategy of the out-of-sample examination is to generate pseudoforecasts or postdictions by estimating the equation's coefficients without a specific election and then using the estimated coefficients and the independent values of the omitted election to determine an expected vote for that election. (Beck 1992; Greene 1993) . That is, the 95% confidence interval of the national forecasting models commonly crosses the 50% vote point. Given these considerations, how confident should we be in the early September trial-heat forecasting model and its forecasts?
The conventional assessment of confidence in the forecasting models examines the various internal goodness-of-fit statistics (the stan- (Campbell 1992 (Fair 1988) (1972, 1978) and the Gallup poll (1981, 1985, 1989) . The Gallup polls used in 1992 were reported in USA Today throughout the course of the campaign.
4. The national two-party presidential popular vote for elections from 1948 to 1992 are calculated from Congressional Quarterly (1985; "Official 1988 Presidential Election Results" 1989; "Official 1992 Presidential Election Results" 1992).
5. The even division of nonmajor party preferences and votes in measuring the two-party vote and tnal-heat poll standings is a departure from conventional practice and the onginal analysis (Campbell and Wink 1990) . The conventional treatment of third-party preferences and votes in a two-party measure essentially apportions them in the same proportion as major party votes and preferences. Given the usual small third-party presence and the closeness of the major party vote, there has been little difference between a proportional division and an even division of these voters. However, a significant difference would emerge if there were a large third-party vote and a lopsided major party vote. In such a circumstance, the assumption of an even division of third-party voters seems safer than a proportional division, because third-party voters quite explicitly have rejected the candidates of both major parties.
6. There is no discernible or statistically significant trend in the accuracy of preference polls as literal forecasts at any of the seven points examined in the 12 election years Polls in early elections in the series are no less accurate than those conducted in more recent years.
7. In the examination of the tnal-heat bivanate regressions, the advantage is highest (2.85 points) in late July and declines from 1.86 in early September to 1 15 in October. With the exception of Holbrook (1991), little attention has been paid in the elections and voting behavior literature to the presidential incumbency advantage. However, several previous forecasting studies have detected this advantage (Fair 1978 (Fair , 1982 (Fair , 1988 (Fair , 1994 Rosenstone 1983; Abramowitz 1988; Campbell 1992; Norpoth 1995) . This is one area in which models seeking to explain voting and elections may learn from the forecasting models. Fair (1978 Fair ( , 1982 Fair ( , 1988 Commerce, 1976 Commerce, , 1980 Commerce, , 1988 Commerce, , 1992 (American Survey 1995 , has postulated "Schneider's law of election-forecasting," which states that "the models work, except when they don't work." The Economist did not indicate whether Schneider had offered a corollary to his law regarding the accuracy of pundits. Also regarding the relative accuracy of the pundits and the forecasting models, the trial-heat model in 1992 was more accurate in its forecast 2 months before the election than most national pundits were only a matter of days before the election (Broder 1992; Campbell 1993 ; also see Rosenstone 1983) .
12. A robust regression analysis on the early September model using second-quarter GNP rather than GDP change finds only a single influence point (1956) and produces only a slight change in the ordinary least squares estimates.
13. Crespi (1988, 136) also finds that preference poll accuracy improves around election day. His examination of 430 polls for different offices found that those conducted within 5 days of the election were more accurate than those conducted between 5 and 12 days before the election, and they, in turn, tended to be more accurate than those conducted more than 12 days prior to election day 14. The practical limit of accuracy may be set by measurement error in the polls and the economic statistics (which are regularly further refined after the July report) and the random or nonsystematic behavior of some voters.
15. Using second-quarter GNP rather GDP change produces the following early September Hibbs (1987) , Erikson and Wlezien (1996) (1948, 1968, 1980, 1988, and 1992) and two early September leads that were reversed (1948 and 1960) . June poll leads expanded only in 1972 and 1984 The early September poll leads expanded only in 1956 and 1980. In his examination of the accuracy of late campaign polls (most taken within 2 weeks of election day), Crespi (1988, 129) (1948, 1956, 1964, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1992) , and 4 do not (1952, 1960, 1968, and 1988 (Campbell 1993 (Campbell 1996) . Nevertheless, assuming that there are no further realignment effects in 1996 and that neither party would gain seats at an even division of both the presidential vote and the prior division of the House, the critical two-party presidential vote for Democrats to regain the House appears to be anywhere from 51.5% to 52.6% of the two-party presidential vote. That is, if Clinton's two-party vote, as conventionally measured, exceeds 51.5% to 52.3%, Democrats should gain in excess of the 20 seats necessary to restore the House majority they lost in the 1994 midterm election. If there are further realignment seats, and there probably are at least a dozen or more, the critical Democratic presidential vote increases by 1 percentage point for about every three such seats (2.7 to 3 coattail seats per presidential vote percentage added to the winning margin).
